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I.

INTRODUCTION

It is a pleasure to comment on Philip Curry, Claire Hill, and
Francesco Parisi's article1 on creating market failures for tax planning.
It is rare that I get to comment on an article in which I agree with the
basic conclusions and, more importantly, in which I agree with the
methodology for reaching those conclusions. Their article provides a
number of important and interesting insights and should provide the
basis for much future work. I offer some comments and suggestions
here.
Although their article is not organized exactly this way, I will
break their conclusions into three parts. First, they analyze how to
optimally set the line between legitimate and illegitimate tax planning.
Second, they discuss whether patents for tax strategies are desirable.
Finally, they argue that the government should exploit market failures
Walter J. Blum Professor of Law, The University of Chicago Law School.
See Philip A. Curry, Claire A. Hill & Francesco Parisi, Creating Failuresin the
Marketfor Tax Planning,26 VA. TAX REV. 943 (2007).
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to reduce tax planning.
II. LEGITIMATE V. ILLEGITIMATE SHELTERS

In the first part of their article, Curry, Hill, and Parisi discuss how
to determine the optimal line between allowable tax planning and
disallowed tax shelters, in their language, legitimate and illegitimate
tax planning. Although they assume that all tax planning is socially
unproductive and wasteful, they conclude that it would not be optimal
to eliminate all tax planning.2 The reason is that as the government
increases the strength of its attacks on tax planning, individuals will
incur additional search costs (dissipation costs) as the easy and
obvious shelters become illegal. The government needs to balance the
additional revenue from reducing tax planning with the additional
search costs incurred when the line is moved to reduce the scope of
legitimate tax planning. There will be some optimal line, which is
likely to stop short of eliminating all tax planning.
There are two aspects of the analysis which are not typical and
worth highlighting. First, they treat as the choice variable the line
between legitimate and illegitimate tax planning. In the economics
literature, this line is usually assumed and the question typically asked
is about the taxpayers' decision in light of audit or detection policies.
Thus, a typical economics paper will start off by noting that there is a
distinction between avoidance and evasion (mapping onto legitimate
and illegitimate) and then discuss the report/nonreport decision in
light of some penalty structure. Curry, Hill, and Parisi instead treat
this line as the choice variable, an approach that I think is valuable as
this line is central to policy debates. Second, many legal analyses
discuss the best way to draw this line but do not explicitly state the
criteria they are using. Curry, Hill, and Parisi want to maximize
welfare taking into account both government revenue and taxpayer
costs. That is Curry, Hill, and Parisi use an economics approach to
answer a question normally addressed only by lawyers. This is, in my
view, the right way to approach tax law policy.
Their basic intuition seems to me to be correct, although there are
a number of subtleties that are worth further exploration. Their
original draft, presented at the Future of Tax Shelters conference,
started to model the issue and I think that completing the model
should be a priority. Consider some of the complexities. First, the
government does not necessarily want to maximize total revenue less
2 Id. at 949.
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dissipation costs, as they suggest. Instead, we usually assume that the
government has a fixed revenue constraint, with the money to be
spent, say, on a fixed set of public goods. With a fixed revenue
constraint and a fixed "tax dissipation function" (how taxpayers react
to loophole closing), the answer would be predetermined, so such an
approach would not work as a way to think about tax shelters. To
make the argument work with a fixed revenue constraint, we have to
posit an alternative source of funds that can be used instead of closing
tax loopholes. The goal in such a case would be to set the marginal
cost of closing tax loopholes equal to the marginal cost of the next
source of funds. We might want to use tools such as Slemrod and
Yitzhaki's marginal efficiency cost of funds formulation3 or Slemrod
and Kopczuk's optimal elasticity of taxable income formulation 4 to
think about how to make such a trade-off. The way that I have
conceptualized the issue in my writing is to think of loopholes as gaps
in the tax base.5 We want to balance all of the various methods of
broadening the base as well as the overall rate structure. Addressing
tax planning is part of this overall set of decisions and is no different,
in a general sense, from broadening the base in other ways.
Second, Curry, Hill, and Parisi model taxpayer's costs as search
costs. They argue that as the government closes off the obvious
loopholes, taxpayers incur additional search costs to find new ones.'
Although correct as part of the story, the costs of sheltering are likely
to also include structuring or other similar costs. Thus, as the
government shuts down the easy to find and use shelters, taxpayers
must spend more to find new ones and also more to implement the
new ones. For example, newer shelters may involve more complex
changes to capital structures, risky investments, etc. Modeling the
problem as search costs leads one to think about information flows
(hence the discussion of patents in their article). Thinking about
other costs of finding and entering into tax shelters suggests
alternative avenues for investigation.
Thus, the government's
strategies will also involve such items as setting the degree of
economic substance or risk that a transaction must have to be
legitimate.
The government should optimize along all these
See Joel Slemrod & Shlomo Yitzhaki, The Costs of Taxation and the Marginal
Efficiency Cost of Funds, 43 IMF STAFF PAPERS 172, 182 (1996).
4 See Joel Slemrod & Wojiech Kopczuk, The Optimal Elasticity of
Taxable
Income, 84 J. PUB. ECON. 91 (2002).
5 See, e.g., David A. Weisbach, Ten Truths About Tax Shelters, 55 TAx L. REV.
201, 231-41 (2002).
6 Curry, Hill & Parisi, supra note 1,
at 949.
3
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boundaries by setting the marginal benefit equal for each of them
(and equal to the marginal cost of funds for other sources of revenue).
Third, later in the article the authors focus on market structure.7
This focus might be incorporated into the study of the optimal
strength of anti-shelter rules. For example, there might be economies
of scale in shelter provision. If so, strategies that focus on different
aspects of shelters might not be additive - they might be more than
additive. Thus, if sheltering becomes expensive enough, shelter
providers might shut down. Understanding the market structure for
tax planning will likely be important to understanding the optimal line
between legitimate and illegitimate structures.
Fourth, we need some way of operationalizing the approach. We
need to get a sense of the optimal strength of attacks on tax shelters.
We need to know the tax dissipation function - how taxpayers will
react to various approaches. I have suggested previously that the
Slemrod and Yitzhaki's marginal cost of funds might be a reasonable
approach to the issue, although I am sure there are others. The
assumption behind the Slemrod and Yitzhaki formula is that on the
margin, all tax reduction strategies have the same cost.8 This allows us
to use the reduction in tax revenues for a given change in tax rates the elasticity of taxable income - as a measure of the dissipation and
all other costs of a tax rule. Measuring elasticities of taxable income
under various tax regimes, although not easy, should be feasible.
III. PATENTS
Patents on tax strategies usually create a strong gut reaction in
many that they are entirely inappropriate. Some react negatively to
the idea of offering legal protection to something, like a tax shelter,
that we should not want to encourage in the first place. Others, often
practitioners, react to the "anticommons" effect - that patents on
basic tax planning ideas will make it difficult to give everyday tax
advice. Imagine a patent on some run-of-the-mill tax strategy. To
take a random example, imagine a patent on various techniques used
to qualify for a tax-free reorganization or liquidation. This is the kind
of advice given everyday by tax lawyers. If these kinds of techniques
were patented, it would be perilous to give tax advice for fear of
violating a patent. Moreover, assembling the necessary licenses for a
complicated tax strategy may be expensive because of the mere costs
7 Id. at 950.
8

Slemrod & Yitzhaki, supra note 3, at 172.
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of the royalties, the costs of finding all of the patent holders, and the
potential for hold-outs. Hence, the reaction that the patenting of tax
advice is contrary to the basic structure of the industry today. Note
that the two gut reactions point in opposite directions: patents will
unduly encourage tax planning and patents will make tax planning
impossible. It is possible that both hold true: everyday tax planning
may be more difficult while exotic tax shelters may become more
rewarding.
It is not clear that tax patents are going away. The original
business method patent involved taxes. Neither the patent office nor
the courts have given any indication of a reversal of course. We need
to move beyond gut reactions to understanding their effect. Curry,
Hill, and Parisi take a refreshingly objective approach to the issue.
They want to know whether patents increase or decrease tax planning
(which, recall, they assume is socially wasteful). 9 Patents increase the
incentive to invest in information by creating property protection for
an idea. But at the same time, by creating a monopoly, they
potentially reduce dissemination. We cannot say, ex ante, which
effect dominates. In the normal patent case, where the idea is socially
useful, we want to increase the total supply, which means that we
hope that the property protection and the incentives it creates for
finding ideas outweigh the costs of giving a temporary monopoly once
the idea is found. In the tax case, we want the opposite.
As Curry, Hill, and Parisi emphasize, the net effect is theoretically
indeterminate. Nevertheless, given the long existence of the patent
system, it is reasonable to assume that the best guess is that patents
increase the supply of ideas. Whether this extends to tax patents
depends on the particular cost structures in the industry (of tax
advice).
One of the key features of the tax advice industry is that it is
relatively inexpensive to create new tax ideas, at least compared with
the costs of creating ideas in many areas. The costs of creating a very
innovative tax strategy is likely to be at least one and maybe two
orders of magnitude less than the costs of, say, finding a new drug.
The implication is that inventors do not need a lot of incentives to
come up with new ideas. They will arise without patents. On the
other hand, the possibility of exclusion means that patents may
significantly increase the reward to being first. In the normal (socially
valuable ideas) case, the balance is likely to lead to the conclusion that
patents are not helpful in these circumstances. Without patents, the
9

Curry, Hill & Parisi, supra note 1, at 953.
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ideas will be developed anyway, the benefits of acceleration likely to
be small, and the costs of exclusion the same as in other areas. In the
tax case (socially wasteful ideas), we might then want patents: the
benefits of exclusion may exceed the costs of incentives.
Low cost of development is also what leads to the potential
anticommons problem - whatever you find is very likely to have
been found by someone else. Many industries live with this problem,
so, tax lawyers, welcome to the club. You have got nothing special to
complain about. Moreover, to the extent that the anticommons
problem reduces tax reducing strategies, it is a good thing. On the
other hand, the anticommons problem may reduce compliance, in
which case tax patents would be undesirable. Remember that the
original business methods patent case, State Street,'1 involved tax
compliance - it was about a method of making reverse 704(c)
Many
allocations in a hub and spoke mutual fund system.
complicated and potentially patentable tax ideals may also be about
compliance: think about the record keeping complexities of many tax
rules, such as the UNICAP rules or rules for interest allocations. It is
easy to imagine innovative compliance mechanisms deserving of
patents. One possibility could be a return to the days when the patent
office examined whether patents were socially desirable before
granting them.
A second factor is that patent holders would have no easy way to
determine when someone else is violating the patent - tax returns are
secret. On the other hand, if the tax advisor is potentially subject to
malpractice for advising a client to enter into a patented strategy, even
a remote possibility of enforcement may be enough.
Third, we need to understand the likely scope of the patents, a
matter likely to be resolved only through litigation. If the scope is
interpreted narrowly, substitutes may be readily available, reducing
the ability of the patent holder to earn profit and also to restrict
supply.
Fourth, we need to understand the effect of tax patents on how
tax ideas get disseminated. Right now, there is a fairly robust
discussion of ideas at conferences, in articles, and among
professionals. Although undoubtedly some techniques are closely
held, I have the impression that most top level professionals know
what the leading techniques are. Patents may change that dynamic,
although it is not obvious in which direction. One possibility is that
10 State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 149 F.3d
1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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there will be less sharing as the possibility of patents makes sharing
costly. On the other hand, basic ideas might be shared more widely to
establish clear evidence that they are not new and, therefore, cannot
be patented. If so, the threat of patents may actually increase
dissemination of tax ideas.
There is much work to be done to understand these effects.
Moreover, other industries might be quite similar to the tax advice
industry but are producing a socially valuable product. Whatever
conclusions we draw about tax patents may have implications for
those other industries and vice versa. Thus, if the speculation that tax
patents may possibly reduce innovation is correct (which would mean
that we want patents in tax), it would also mean that we would not
want patents in similar areas.
Finally, I was struck by Curry, Hill and Parisi's suggestion that the
government purchase some key tax patents and refuse to grant
royalties." This idea seems very clever, although the government, in
such a case, could always simply prohibit the strategy by law rather
than by owning the patent. Perhaps a more promising route is for a
nonprofit who cares about tax compliance, to patent some tax ideas.
For example, Citizens for Tax Justice could hire a few good tax
lawyers to invent some strategies and patent them. It could then hold
the patents tightly, thereby preventing a variety of tax shelters.
I do not yet have a well-informed view on tax patents, except that
(i) the issue seems complicated and (ii) they may be here to stay, so
that secondary issues such as their scope and which ideas can be
patented, may be where the action is. Once we get over the fact of tax
shelter existence, we can begin to work to ensure that they are socially
valuable: to make them encourage or at least not hurt compliance, but
discourage or at least not increase sheltering.
IV. THE TAX SHELTER MARKET

The heart of Curry, Hill, and Parisi's article is the idea that the
government can reduce tax sheltering by creating or exploiting market
failures." This is a very interesting and, as far as I know, original idea.
The analysis of tax patents naturally falls within this category, but it is
much broader than patents alone. The authors take the usual list of
market failures and see how they might apply in the tax context.
Curry, Hill, and Parisi go through all of the well-known reasons
1 Curry, Hill & Parisi, supra note 1, at 953.
12

Id. at 961.
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for market failure. Because they try to be complete, it is not the case
that each of these failures has an equal likelihood of applying in the
tax context. Thus, creating a lemons market does not seem likely to
help, at least for corporate tax shelters where the taxpayers tend to be
well advised. On the other hand, it might work in the individual tax
shelter market, where individuals may have a harder time discerning
quality. Misallocating risk, however, may work well in the corporate
context, where the threat of sanctions on a tax advisor may
substantially increase the effective risk aversion used when evaluating
a strategy. Without taking a view on the merits of the recent
indictments of tax advisors (mostly from KPMG), the threat of such
indictments might be a way to inject a significant dose of risk aversion
into the tax shelter market. Pressure on accounting firms with respect
to their approval of accounting benefits for tax shelters may work for
similar reasons - find a weak point in the chain of production where
imposition of risk is likely to be very costly and put the threat of
sanctions there.
One suggestion not pursued by Curry, Hill, and Parisi is
preventing price discrimination. This prevents someone with an
exclusive idea from fully capturing the benefits, thereby restricting
supply to the monopoly supply. Limitations on charging fees based on
a percent of tax savings can be seen in this light.
Curry, Hill, and Parisi point to four examples to illustrate their
theories: the check-the-box regulations, 3 interest tracing (as opposed
to pro rata allocation), 4 Circular 230,15 and the Thompson/McNulty
memo.16 The check-the-box regulations and interest tracing, they
argue, show that the government does not attempt to eliminate all tax
reducing strategies, instead sometimes blessing them. Examples of
this sort abound. The government lets taxpayers engage in tax
reducing strategies all the time, with some of them producing
significant revenue losses. It is difficult, for example, to estimate the
revenue loss associated with tax havens, but if we wanted to eliminate
them or at least significantly reduce their number, it would not be
hard: the United States can have significant influence on the behavior
of small, defenseless nations if it wants. My main comment is that it is
difficult, however, to know whether holding back in such areas is a
result of political failures (or more generally, political calculations),

13 Id.

14 Id. at 962.
15 Id. at 963.
16

Id. at 964.
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optimal tax policy, or just a mistake. Although I agree with Curry,
Hill, and Parisi about the optimality argument, I do not know what to
make of any particular example.
On the other hand, the
pervasiveness of tax planning and the corresponding limited attempt
to reduce it by the government may be an indication that the costs of
reducing tax planning are not worth the additional revenue that would
be raised, consistent with Curry, Hill, and Parisi's suggestion.
Their market disruption examples fare better. Circular 230 and
the Thompson/McNulty memo seem like clear examples of market
disruption. Similarly, the rules regarding contingency fees seem
aimed at making pricing less efficient. There are likely to be other
examples. Thus, uncertainty may help disrupt sheltering. Anti-abuse
rules have this feature - they have uncertain content, potentially
forcing taxpayers to be more conservative than they would be if they
had clear boundaries. Similarly, refusing to provide rules in some
areas may be an example of the same strategy. Thus, the lack of rules
in the debt/equity area or with regard to what is a constructive sale
may prevent aggressive behavior. Rules against tax insurance may be
a way of preventing signaling of quality, thereby creating adverse
selection. Given the variety of examples of market disruption, I get
the sense that the government already understand the point. Curry,
Hill, and Parisi do the job of framing it and generalizing it. Their
article is a worthy contribution to the literature.
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